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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
v.
BRENT LESLIE DOCK,

Case No. 15503

Defendant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of assault by a prisoner,
a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1953 as amended),
in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Ctah, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, presiding.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Brent Leslie Dock, was charged by information with
aggravated assault by a prisoner, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103.5
(1953 as amended) a second degree felony.

On October 13, 1977,

he was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of (simple)

assault by a prisoner in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102. 5
(1953 as amended) .

The defendant was sentenced by the court on

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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October 21, 1977, to serve not more than five years in the Utah
State Prison, the indeterminate term of imprisonment which is
provided by law.

This sentence was to be served consecutively

with the term he was then serving.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of guilt
entered against him and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts adduced at trial were conflicting, however, the
various witnesses for the parties testified as follows:
At approximately 6:10 a.m. on January 29, 1977, Brent
Leslie Dock, a prisoner confined in medium security, cell #A-314
at the Utah State Prison was awakened by Jack Manneh, a correctiona:
Sergeant, and informed that he was being transferred to maximum
security at the prison (T.7).
Manneh testified at trial that he came on duty at 6 o'clock
that morning and was called by his supervisor to transfer inmate
Dock to maximum security (T .19).

He told Dock that he was being

moved to maximum security for throwing a coke can at Officer MorreL
earlier that day (T.24).

Dock denied hitting the officer with t~

coke can, but Manneh proceeded to transport the prisoner anyway
(T.39).
Officer Morrell, a correctional guard at the prison opene:
.Manneh reporr:ed
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that after the door was opened, he proceeded to walk away from
appellant's cell down the hallway to maximum security.

He heard

a crash and testified that he was attacked by Dock with a peanut butter
jar (T. 26-27), which resulted in a struggle.

Officer Wells,

another correctional officer at the prison aided Manneh and transported Dock downstairs (T.29).

Officer Manneh, not seriously

injured, was treated for minor wounds at the prison hospital and
worked the rest of his shift that day (T. 30, 45).
Donald F. Morrell

testified that he and the appellant

had had an argument earlier that day, January 29th.

He was

working the 12:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. shift and was making the
routine block count when he accidently kicked a can that was on the
tier of the third deck.

As he was coming back down the tier,

Morrell reported that he was hit in the back of his right leg with

a: a coke can (T.81).

He stated that Dock said he didn't like him

kicking the can in front of his "house" (cell).

As a result, the

officer informed Dock that this incident would be written up
(T.82-83).
James A. Wells, another correctional officer at the Utah
State Prison, testified that he was working the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
~i:

shift that day and was ordered to go to "A" Block with Officer
Manneh.

Officer Morrell was at the control panel at this time

(T.86-88).

Wells stated that Manneh informed inmate Dock that he

'.·ias being transported to maximum security.
nei

Manneh told Morrell to

~he door and Wells reported that a struggle between Dock and
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Manneh resulted.

Wells did not see Dock hit Manneh (T. 89-91 99)
'

.

anG

testified that Dock was apparently upset at the thought of being
moved to maximum security (T.101).
The Appellant, Brent Dock,

testified that on January

n:

he had been working in the prison print shop in medium security
all day.

He stated that he returned to his cell about 6: 00 p.m. on

that day and was very tired from working.

He testified that about

3: 00 a. m. on the morning of January 29th he had a discussion with
Officer Morrell.

The officer had kicked a coke can in front of his

cell and Dock testified that he picked up the can and threw it over
the tier.

Morrell came back to Dock's cell and accused him of

throwing the coke can at him (T.67-69).
Dock further testified that about 6:00 a.m. some other
officers awakened him, attempting to come into his cell.

Dock

stated that he was scared that the officers were going to come in
and beat him up and that Manneh proceeded to pull him out of his
cell and appellant testified that the officer apparently slipped
and hit his head.

Dock denied having any peanut butter jar in his

cell and stated the only thing he felt at that point was fear that
they would use force to take him to maximum security (T. 71-73) · No
peanut butter jar or pieces therefrom were presented as evidence at
trial by the State.
Appellant stated that it was dark in the hallway and
the lights were off in his cell.

He wasn't informed that he was

going to maximum security prior to this pre-dawn visit although
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The aopellant

Dock, maintains that he did nothing to warrant being transported
to maximum security although he has remained at that more restrictive
location since the time of this incident (T.74-75).
At trial, appellant, through counsel, excepted to
several of the trial court's jury instructions.

Specific exception

was made to the court's "Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner" elements
Instruction No. 11 since a crucial element, the mens rea, or intent,
was lacking (T .108).
Exception also was taken to the trial court's Instruction
No. 20 which defined the lesser included offense of Assault by a
Prisoner for the failure of the Court to include the crucial element
of intent.

(T .109 and 111)
The failure of the Court to give proposed defense

instructions offered by the appellant, No. 12-17 on self defense
and defense of habitation was similarly excepted to on the basis
that the court should have instructed on those defenses since proper
evidence was presented raising those issues for the consideration of
t~ trier of fact (T.110-111).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION
AND NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED SINCE THE COURT FAILED
TO INSTRUCT ON THE SPECIFIC MENS REA OR "INTENT"
REQUIRED UNDER THE UTAH AGGRAVATED ASSAULT BY A PRISONER
AND ASSAULT BY A PRISONER STATUTES.
A fundamental principle of substantive criminal law
·~q·!ires a specific mental state or mens rea in order to be convicted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of a particular crime.

The totality of conduct, mental fault,

plus attendant circumstances when required by the definition of the
crime make up the "elements".

La Fave and Scott, Handbook on

Criminal Law, Section 2 (197 2 at 8) .

Therefore, one of the basic

premises of the criminal law is that for criminal responsibility
to attach,

the mens rea or particular state of mind must be present

to bring about the consequences set forth in the crime charged.
The Criminal Code for the State of Utah enacted in 19J:
specifically embodies this basic principle of substantive criminal
law in Utah Code Ann.

§76-2-101 (1953 as amended) wherein it is

stated:
Re uirements of criminal conduct and criminal
responsi i ity. - No person is guilty o an o fense
unless his conduct is prohibited by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly
or with criminal negligence with respect to each eleme:
of the offense as the definition of the offense
requires; or
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving
strict liability.
(Emphasis Supplied)
Also Utah Code Ann.

§76-2-102 (1953 as amended) provk

Culpable mental state re uired- Strict_ liabilit ·
-=-Every o ense not invo ving strict lia i ity 3h~l\c
require a culpable mental state, and when the deTinI ·
of the offense does not specify a culpable mental f".
state, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall su !l'.'t
to establish criminal responsibility. An offens7 ~hai
involve strict liability only when a statute definin~.
the offense clearly indicates a legislative purp~s~;
impose strict liability for the conduct by us~ ? r ..
phrase "strict liability" or other terms of s1m 11a
import.
(Emphasis Supplied)

-6-
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Counsel for appellant took specific exception to the trial
court's failure to instruct on the crucial element of intent making
specific reference to the aforementioned statutes (T.108).

Appellant,

through counsel, offered proper instructions embracing the proper
elements of both Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner and (simple)
Assault by a Prisoner. 1 (T .108-111)
A.

(SIMPLE) ASSAULT BY A PRISONER

The Appellant was convicted of Assault by a Prisoner a lesser
included offense of Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner as charged in
the Information.

The trial court's error in failing to properly

define the elements of the lesser included offense is error which
requires reversal of Appellant's conviction.
Assault by a prisoner requires a specific intent or mens
rea as an element of that offense.

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1953

as amended) provides in its entirety:
Any prisoner who commits assault,

intending to cause
bodily injury is guilty of a felony of the third
degree.
(Emphasis Supplied).

,.. l. Proper exception was therefore taken to the trial Court's instructions by
" appellant under Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Utah Code Ann. §77-37-1
Ci (19~3 as amended), and Rule 5.4, Rules of Practice in the District Court, preserving
, be issue for appeal before this Court.
,l

-7-
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It is this basic element of intent which the trial
court refused to include in the charge to the jury in Instruction
No. 20.

The Court's instruction stated in pertinent part:
INSTRUCTION NO. 20
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of
by a Prisoner, the lesser offense included in the
crime of Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner charged in the
Information on file in this case, you must believe from all
of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and
every one of the following elements of that offense:
1. That on or about the 29th day of January, 1977,
within the corporate limits of Salt Lake County, the defenda:·
Brent Leslie Dock assaulted Manneh;
2.
Said defendant was then and there a prisoner ...
As~aul t

The appellant made timely request for the inclusion of the
crucial element of intent in defendant's proposed Instruction No. B
This instruction set out the elements of the lesser included offense
as follows:
1.
That on or about the 29th day of January, 1977,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, BRENT
LESLIE DOCK, did attempt, with unlawful force or violence
to do bodily injury to Jack Manneh.
2.
That BRENT LESLIE DOCK was then and there confined
in the Utah State Prison.
3.
That said Assault was accomplished intentionally.
For a person to be found criminally responsible, the court
must instruct the jury on the essential elements of the crime charge(
The State has the burden of proving each and every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
1068, 25 L. Ed.

2d 368 (1970).

face of the record,

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.
When plain error is evident

on the

i.e., failure to instruct on the mens rea

required for a particular crime, this court must reverse the trial
State v. wajj. 9~
court and grant a new trial to remedy the error.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ei

297, 6; P.2d 647 (1937).

The trial judge bears a particularly heavy responsibility to
correctly charge the jury as to the essential elements of the
offense, even in the absence of an objection or a request by counsel.
".hus, as one court has stated:
"Just as an indictment which omits an essential element
of the crime charged must be dismissed as fatally defective
the trial judge's failure here to instruct the jury on all
the essential elements of the crime in counts two and
four even though not requested, was plain error."
United States v. Musgrave, 444 F.2d 755, 764 (5th Cir. 1971).
Accord: Green v. United States, 405 F.2d 1363, 1370
(D.C. Cir. 1968)
Case law in Utah supports the proposition that the current
assault and aggravated assault statutes, amended in 1974, retained the
mental element of specific intent that was required under the former
assault statute.

Hence, the failure of the trial court to instruct

on the mens rea element becomes plain error, particularly as in the
instant case wherein a proper instruction was requested by
appellant.
In State v. Potello, 42 Utah 396, 132 P.14 (1913), defendant
was

convicted of an assault under the former Utah assault statute,

Utah Code Ann. §76-7-6 (1953 repealed) which provided:
"Every person who, with intent to do bodily h<:rm and
without just cause or excuse, or when no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances show an
abandoned or "malignant heart", commits an a~sault upon
the person of another with a deadly weapon, instrument or
other thing is punishable by imprisonmen~ in the state.
prison not exceeding five years, or by fine not exceeding
$1,000 or by both." (Emphasis Supplied)
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This Court held that "intent to do bodily harm is the very essence
of the offense and it must be proved as alleged."
Similarly,

(132 P.14 at 15).:

the intent required under the percursor of the

new code's (simple) assault by a prisoner statute was discussed
in State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 148 P.2d 327 (1944).

In that case

defendant was an inmate at the Utah State Prison and was charged wit:
an assault upon prison guards.

The mens rea of "malice" under the

former Utah statute, was construed as requiring more "than a mere
wish to vex or annoy the person assaulted."
Furthermore,

(148 P.2d at 331)

the so-called simple assault statute is a

lesser included offense of the aggravated assault statute and requin
a specific intent as the mental element of that crime.

State v.

Nielsen, 30 U.2d 119, 514 P.2d 535 (1972).
The appellant appropriately submitted the proposed jury
instructions to the trial court on the elements of aggravated assaulr
and simple assault under the Utah statutes.
defined

These instructions

the necessary elements of aggravated assault and the lesser

included offense of simple assault which requires the mental element

2

~re recently

the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals followed the holding of the,

P~tello case requlring proof of intent to be convicted tmder the old felony statue
Green v. Turner, 409 F. 2d 215 (10th Cir. 1969).
-10-
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of "intent" to cause serious bodily injury to another.

The

bstructions given by the court failed to set forth the mens rea
.-

0 ~ intent requirement under those statutes.
~struction

As a result the court's

failed to meet even the threshold requirement of

substantive criminal law, since the court failed to instruct on all
e of the essential elements of the crime under the Utah statutes.

This

t:was clearly prejudicial to the appellant since the jury was not made
aware of the mental element required in order for criminal responsibility
tJ attach.
The thrust of the argument of defense counsel at trial was
t~at

under the circumstances, the state had failed to prove that

rnthe appellant "intentionally" struck Officer Manneh, if he struck

11

him at all.

The failure of the Court to include the intent as an element
of the offense in the instructions could have led the jury to believe
'

that intent was not an element and that the burden of proof did not
rest on the State to prove the culpable mens rea beyond a reasonable

~r doubt; or stated differently, the jury could conceivably have believed

It

ut:

that aggravated assault by a prisoner and assault by a prisoner are
strict liability offenses.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-101, 102 (1953

as amended) however, show that such is not the law in the State of
Utah.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that it is "plain"
error to refuse to instruct the jury on the essential elements of
'tatet:ory '2riminal offense.

In State v. Johnson, 221 Wis· 444,
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453-455, 267 N.W. 14, 18 (1936), the defendant was charged with
armed robbery under a statute which required a finding of "intent,
if resisted,

to kill or maim the person robbed."

The trial court

did not instruct the jury that it was required to find such
intent.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held this failure reversible

error.3
In United States v. Bryant, 461 F. 2d 912 (6th Cir. 1972)
the court reversed the defendant's conviction for aiding and abettin
the violation of certain federal revenue laws.

1

The trial court had

failed to instruct on the requisite mental state for conviction oo~
the Federal Act, and the court noted the fatal significance of such
failure.
. . . soecific criminal intent is an element of the
offense. of aiding and abetting, and "[w]here intent of the
accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its
existence is a question of fact which must be submitted
to the jury." Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
274, 72 S. Ct. 240, 255, 9 L.Ed. 288 (1952). Many criminal
statutes expressly include the requirement that the acc~se~
specifically intend to have performed a particular criminal
act.
See, e.g., 18 U.S. C. §2114.
Many others, however,
such as the aiding and abetting statute, do not, even
though specific intent is an element of the offense. In
either case, the jury must be charged fully and accurately
on intent.
See Morissette v. United States, supra;

3. Accord: People v. Davis, 74 Ill. App. 2d 450, 221 N.E. 2d 63 (1966);
Coamonwealth v. Tracey, 137 Pa. Super 221, 8 A. 2d 622, 625 (1939); Brook v. St~,
Okla., 115 P. 1026 (1911).

-12-
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United States v. Bryant, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 124, 420 F.2d
I327, 1333 (1969); Bradle~ v. United States, 136 U.S. App.
D.C. 420 F.2d 181, 1~8 (1 69); Findley v. United States,
362 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1966); Jackson v. United States,
121 U.S. App. D.C. 160, 348 F.2d 772 (1965); 2 C. Wright,
supra, §487, at 302. Intent, like willfulness or
premeditation, is a subjective element the existence of
which usually must be inferred from evidence of overt acts
but if the jury is not instructed that intent must be found
to have existed, the danger is great that a conviction may
result on the basis of overt acts alone. . . The
possibility that substantial prejudice resulted to
appellant from the court's omission of an instruction on
intent is sufficient to require reversal. See United States v.
Rybicki, supra 403 F.2d ~t 604; Jackson v. United States,
supra (461 F.2d 920-21).
B.

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT BY A PRISONER

Although the Appellant was convicted of the lesser included
offense of Assault by a Prisoner at trial, the trial court's failure
'to instruct the jury on the crucial mental element of "intent" required
for the more serious crime was error which requires reversal of

Appellant's conviction.
Aggravated assault has been recognized in modern times by
legislatures as a more serious criminal offense than simple assault
or battery.

As a result statutes have been worded various ways to

!. Accord: United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, 1334 (2d Cir. 1973) United
States v. Thanas, 459 F.2d 172, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1972); and Screws v. Uniteasta:Ees,
3'25 U.S. 91, 106-107 (1944).
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attach criminal responsibility.

The Utah Statute on Aggravated

Assault by a Prisoner, Utah Code Ann.

§76-5-103.5 (1953 as amendec

specifically requires the mens rea of "intent" to cause b d

o ily inj::

as an essential element of that crime.

Therefore, in order to be

convicted under that statute, the Utah legislature required

a spec::

intent for criminal responsibility to attach.
The elements Instruction No. 11, given by the Court on

Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner stated the elements in pertinent p:
as follows:
(1) That on or about the 29th day of January, i;
within the corporate limits of Salt Lake County, the de'
ant, Brent Leslie Dock, assaulted J. Manneh;
(2) That said defendant then and there used a
deadly weapon; and,
(3)
Said defendant was then and there a prisoner
The new aggravated assault statute, Utah Code Ann. 976·:
(1953 as amended) was recently construed by the Utah Supreme Court'.
State v. Howell, Utah 554 P.2d 1326 (1976).

The statute provides.

(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he
. .
commits assault defined in Section 76-5-102 and:
(a)
He intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means o:
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the third:
In that case defendant was convicted of an aggravated assault which:
out of a pool game between two close friends.
5. The appellant's requested elements instruction on aggravated assault (Defend::
Request No. 2) stated in pertinent part:
. "~·
". . . (1) That on or about the 29th day of January, 1977, ill Sa:·.
Coi.mty, State of Utah, the defendant, Brent Les lie Doc~, ~d
a deadly :~,·
the person of Jack Mann.eh with such means or force making i.t h.Kely to pro
or serious bodily injury.
. ..
(2) That said Brent Leslie Dock was then and t.11ere conl:lr:ithe Utah State Prison.
2
(3) Tbat said assault TtJas a:coITJPlishec'. by t.'1e use cif Lir.l '"
" (Emphasis Sc.y~lied)
and violence and intentionallv

u.:;
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The defendant, Howell's brief focused on part "a" of the
',tatute which requires "intent to cause serious bodily injury to another".
:he defendant's defense was lack of specific intent.

The State's

'.:.,rief focused on part "b" of the statute which requires "use of
1

deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce death or

serious bodily injury."

The State claimed that a mere general intent

'')r awareness was required.
The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction in that case
:,,based on an "inferred" intent.

E.:

Nevertheless, the court concluded

that each party correctly construed the statute and held that part
r

"a" of the statute requires a specific

intent.

In the present case, appellant was charged by Information under
'· part "a" of the aggravated assault statute which requires a specific
intent as an essential element of the offense.

Based on the

reasoning of Howell, in order for the appellant to be criminally
responsible the mens rea must be present and the court is dutybound

o: to instruct on the specific intent.

The Howell case suggests that the mens rea required is an

h: intent to inflict great bodily injury.

The legislature has manifest

a policy under the new aggravated assault statute in requiring a
more serious mental element than a mere general intent.

By amending

z;

:~

the old assault statute to require an aggravated circumstance, the

1: specific intent requirement is clearly retained.

r:

Additionally,
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appellant was charged under the subsection of the statute which
specifically requires "intent" to cause serious bodily injury.

Therefore, failure of the trial court to give the requested instruct
on the elements of the crime under which appellant was charged was
clearly prejudicial.

Furthermore, the conviction of assault by a

prisoner was improper since it is a lesser included offense of
aggravated assault by a prisoner, and the trial court's failure to
properly instruct on the necessary mental element of either offense
could not help but lead the jury to believe that no culpable mental
state was required for conviction of either offense.
The history of the assault statute amended in 1974,
evidences the legislative intent to retain a "specific intent"
as the essential mens rea that was required under the old Utah felon
statute.

In the instant case, appellant was charged by information

under the current felony statute with the crime of aggravated assaul
by a prisoner by use of a deadly weapon, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103.4
(1953 as amended), to-wit:

A broken coffee bottle with intent to

cause serious bodily injury to the said J. Manneh and while said Brer
Leslie Dock was confined as a prisoner in the Utah State Prison."
Clearly, the new statutes have retained the specific intent requirer::i
of Potello and Nemier, under the old felony statute which has been
construed as requiring "malice" or something more than a mere wish
to annoy.

Under the new code, the legislature eliminated the

-16-
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listinction

between assault and battery and has adopted the aggravated

ssault statute, recognizing a more serious crime than the so-called
imp le assault under the old statute.

As a result of the more serious

t'.

ature of the crime under the new statute, the legislature has
etained a specific intent in order for criminal responsibility to
ttach and merely substituted "intent" for "malignant heart" as
he required mens rea.
The failure to instruct on the intent requirement under the
.ggravated Assault by a Prisoner statute and the failure of the
:rial court to instruct on "intent" element of (simple) assault
y a prisoner statute in effect directed a verdict for the State on

:his crucial element.

In a criminal case this is not only plain

!rror, but error of constitutional significance and a denial of due

on;

1rocess of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
:onstitution and Article One, Section Seven of the Constitution of

ul:

Jtah.

en:

r::e::

The appellant's right to a trial by jury is also abrogated

•hen the trial court in effect indicates that one of the elements
lf an offense has been established.

Sixth Amendment to the United

ltates Constitution and Article I Section 10 of the Constitution of
Jtah.

See State v. Estrada, 119 U. 339, 227 P.2d 247 (1951). In re

~shi£, supra.

United States v. Skinner, 437 F.2d 164, 165 (5th Cir .

.971) and United States v. Alessio, 439 F.2d 803, 804 (1st Cir. 1971) ·
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The erroneous instructions on both these offenses is
plain error demanding reversal of the appellant's conviction and a
new trial.
POINT II
FAILURE TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE
OF HABITATION DEMANDS REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL SINCE
APPELLANT REQUESTED SUCH INSTRUCTIONS .~~D APPELLANT'S OWN
TESTIMONY RAISED A SELF-DEFENSE ISSUE.
Appellant contends that substantial evidence was presented
at trial giving rise to an appropriate self-defense and defense of
habitation instruction.

Generally,

the trial court is "duty-bound".

to instruct on self-defense and defense of habitation when requestec
and appellant's own testimony raises the issue.

Confusion as to th<.

quantum of proof required for the self-defense issue has arisen

frequently, but this court has held that if any substantial evidenc<.
is presented, the self-defense and defense of habitation instructior
is appropriate.

State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 141, 185 P.2d 738(:

The trial court is obliged to give the accused's "theoryo:
the case" to the jury if it is at all supported by the facts in
evidence.

United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 390 (7th Cir. 19r

Spears v. United States, 387 F.2d 698, 702 (10th Cir. 1967).
The trial judge may not weigh the evidence supporting a "t~<
of the case" instruction, and if he declines to charge on the defendz:,:
theory of the case, he in effect directs a verdict on that issue
against the defendant.
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. . . If the trial judge evaluates or screens the
evidence supporting a proposed defense, and upon such
evaluation declines to charge on that defense, he
dilutes the defendant's jury trial by removing the issue
from the jury's consideration. In effect, the trial
judge directs a verdict on that issue against the
defendant. This is impermissible." Strauss v. United
States, 376 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 1967).

uested

n considering the propriety of the denial of a favorable defense
.nstruction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to reg_uire
.t,

an appellate court should view the evidence most favorably to the

lefendant.

Richardson v. United States, 403 F.2d 574, 575 (D.C. Cir .

.968).

Where special facts present an evidentiary theory which, if
ielieved, would defeat the factual theory of the prosecution, a
:heory of the case instruction must be given provided i t is tendered.
lnited States v. Leach, 427 F. 2d 1107, 1113 (1st Cir. 1970).

A. SELF-DEFENSE
In State v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 120 P. 497 (1911),
this Court
f
ras

noted the unharmonious decisions concerning the amount

proof required for the self-defense issue.
charged with murder.

In that case, defendant

The court instructed the jury that the
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defendant must present a preponderance
a self-defense instruction.

o

f

·d
ev:i.. ence to be entitled tc

The court held that the preponderance

standard was error and the appropr:i.."ate s t an d ar d was to b ring forth
"some" evidence to overcome the burden.

The court concluded:

'' . . . the bur~en is ~ast upon the defendant to bring
forward the evidence in support of justification or
excuse, but is not required to establish the justification
or excuse by a preponderance of the evidence before he is
entitled to avail himself of the defense."
(120 p. at 501)
More recently,

this court held that a requested self-defense

instruction is properly refused only if evidence is so slight as to
be incapable of raising a reasonable doubt while viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant.

State v. Cast:

23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969).
Furthermore, the general rule in Utah specifies that it is
prejudicial error to refuse to give a requested instruction if then
was some evidence supporting the request.

In State v. Talarico,

57 Utah 229, 193 P. 860 (1920), defendant was convicted of an assaul'
with a deadly weapon.

The self-defense instruction was refused

since appellant's attorney failed to timely request such

instr~t~

6. The court failed to give any instructions on the defense issues. P-equested !:'
tbs . 12 and 13 provided: (T. 110-111)
..
"A person is justified in threatening or using force against another'.''
and to the extent he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defense
against such other's irrnri.nent use of imlawful force . . . "
,
"A person is justified in using force against another when. and to the·
that he reasonably believes the force is necessary to prevent or tenrunate the
other's imlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation. . . "
. ,.
Requested Instruction No. 16 entitled defendant to an acquittal if t;<
is a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant acted in self defense or deferoe 1 ~'.
h2bitation. It stated: "The defendant need not present any evidence to entithiID to an acquittal, however, if che defendant produces suffi~ier:it evider:ce 0 ~;i
justification to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the killing was Ju.sci.rot he is entitled to an acquittal."
1
'

0
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The court noted that if there is any doubt as to selfdefense, it is error to refuse the instruction.
In the instant case, appellant should have been
entitled to the proposed self-defense Instruction No. 12
(footnote 6, supra), since his own testimony raised the
self-defense issue.

Evidence at trial indicated by

appellant that the appellant was accosted in his "house"
(cell) without an opportunity to explain and in the predawn hours when by his own testimony he was tired from a
hard days work the previous day, and in the semi-conscious
state of awakening from a sound sleep.
The appellant was clearly provoked by this
intrusion and that, in itself, raised a reasonable doubt
in Dock's mind as to defending himself when he was
surprised by the pre-dawn visit from the guards.

J[

k

,,

~:.
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Appellant acted in reasonable fear when he was awakened
from a semi-conscious sleep in the darkness of his cell.

He was

shocked by this effort of the guards to take him to maximum
security when he had

~o

hearing or chance to explain his position

via routine prison procedure.
The substantial evidence produced at trial and appellant'
own testimony clearly falls within the Talarico rule, since some
evidence raising the prospect of a reasonable doubt as to the
necessity of self-defense has been raised.

Under the general rules

ennunciated by this Court, appellant met his burden of producing
some evidence, State v. Castillo, supra.

Therefore, failure to giv

the requested self-defense instruction under Talarico, was prejudic
error.
B.

DEFENSE OF HABITATION

The defense of habitation Instruction No. 13 (footnote 2,
supra), was appropriate since some evidence was produced to raise
a reasonable doubt.

This Court in State v. Micheson, Utah, 560 P.1

1120 (1977), discussed the policy underlying this defense.
case defendant was convicted of second degree murder.
was protection of his sister's home.

In~~

His defense

This Court concluded that

"habitation" extends to "actual" or "substitute" residence and coul
include protection of a sister's residence.

The court reversed ana

remanded the case for failure of the lower court to give the reaues
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efense of habitation instruction, since Micheson submitted some
vidence raising the defense of habitation issue.
The Court construed the defense of habitation statute,
tah Code Ann. §76-2-405 (1953), 7

as aiming to protect

person;s residence and preserve the peace.

This Court concluded:

. The policy of the statute has it's roots in the ancient and honored
.octrine of the common law that a man's home is his castle."
560 P. 2d at 1122) .

Thus, "habitation" has been applied to any

substitute" home in order to preserve the peace.
As a result, the defense of habitation instruction should
i

1ave been given as requested by appellant since some evidence was

L1roduced to raise the prospect of a reasonable doubt as to the
tecessity of defending his living accomodations.

Under Micheson,

'habitation" would apply to appellant's cell since such was his
'substitute home".

The issue was clearly raised since appellant

: · The defense of habitation as outlined in the Utah Criminal Code provides in its
'!!ltirety:
Force in defense of habitation. - A person is justified in using force
tgainst another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that the force is
!7essary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon
~s habitation; however, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or
.ikely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if:
(1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and t:t.mJ.ltuous manner
111
d he reasonably believes that the entry is attempted or made for the purpose of
isaulting or offering personal violence to any person, dwelling or being. therein and
iat the force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence; or
(2) He reasonably believes that the entry is ma~e or attempted for the
,JUrp:Jse of corrrnitting a felony therein and that such force is necessary to prevent
".lie Coarnission of the felony.
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testified that he feared what the security guards were going to do
to him in coming to his cell after "racking the doors".

His fear

of being "beaten up" was reasonably based on the altercation with
Officer Morrell earlier that day and appellant testified he was
merely trying to prevent
hours of the morning.

the unlawful entry to his home in the dark
Failure to give the requested instruction,

therefore, when some evidence was presented, was prejudicial err~ 1
under Micheson, supra, demands reversal and remand for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
One of the basic premises of the criminal law is the

requirement that a particular state of mind or mens rea must be pre:
for criminal responsibility to attach.

Appellant was charged under

the Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner statute, Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-103. 5 (1953 as amended)

(a) which manifests the legislative

policy requiring a "specific intent".

As a result a person should

only be held criminally responsible if the state proves "each and
every element" of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court refused to instruct on the essential menti:
element required under the aggravated assault statute by a prisoner
and the lesser included offense of (simple) assault by a prisoner.
This error violates all notions of the fundamental principles upon
which our criminal law is based and was clearly prejudicial to
appellant's rights demanding reversal and a new trial.
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Similarly, the appellant was entitled the self-defense
nstruction when requested since substantial evidence was presented
aising the self-defense issue.

A defendant in a criminal case

hould be entitled to all available defenses when some evidence
s presented capable of raising a reasonable doubt in the minds
f the jury.

Appellant was clearly put in a defensive posture by the
unts that occurred prior that day at the Utah State Prison .
.e had had an altercation with one of the prison guards and
.cted reasonably in the prison context when the prison guards suddenly
.wakened him from his pre-dawn sleep.

It is entirely reasonable

.. hat a prisoner would attempt to defend himself and his "home"
rben a guard unexpectedly comes to his cell, and tries to pull him
1ut into a dark hallway to take him to maximum security when no prior
1earing is given which is routine prison procedure.

Appellant was

:rightened and upset by this surprise attack upon him and was
~tifiably

provoked at the though of losing all freedom by being

:ransported to maximum security.
The self-defense and defense of habitation issues were
:learly raised by this series of events.

As a result, failure to

;ive the requested instructions constituted reversible error on
:he part of the court below requiring reversal and a new trial·
Respectfully submitted,

RONALD J. YENGICH
Attorney for Appellant
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